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Perhaps the safest thing to say about the condition of music, as seen by those who 
write (and write about) verse, is this: if we try to define it in any kind of rigorous, 
academic way, we always discover it to be historical. We find that it appears, not 
fixed, but fluctuating with people’s perspectives on the nature of truth, of 
meaning, of beauty, and of the relationship between the arts, humanity, divinity, 
and the material universe, as well as with the changing forms of music and poetry 
themselves. However, as soon as we allow ourselves to think in a way that comes 
(dare I say it?) more naturally than the rigorous and academic, we spontaneously 
talk about the condition of music as if it were something timeless and essential, 
unchanging, eternal. The writers that have always seemed to me to shed the most 
light upon such questions are those who do not shy away from this paradox, who 
combine a powerful sense of history and of their transient place within it, with the 
courage to assume, rather than deny, their impulse to talk about music as if it were 
an absolute, as if it were possible to generalise about it. Their discourse is founded 
upon contradictions; but for me, the truth is to be found in the functioning of 
those contradictions. 
Helping those contradictions to rub along without too much friction, I find that 
within the series of relative, historically circumscribed truths concerning the 
condition of music, there are some which have proven to be surprisingly long-lived 
and widespread. They have been shared by people who, on the surface, appear to 
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agree about almost nothing else, and as a result, they can easily be lent an aura of 
general validity, going beyond contentious individual opinion. This essay seeks to 
bring one of those to light, by comparing two books, both published in the 1990s, 
which present radically different, indeed totally opposed views of what actually 
constitutes music, and what constitutes poetry; and yet, at a deeper level, on the 
question of the condition of music, they could be said to agree. They are books 
which I simply happen to have read recently because they were brought to my 
attention by students: Jean-François Lyotard’s Moralités postmodernes by Matt 
Mendez, Douglas Hofstadter’s Le Ton beau de Marot by Hannah Grego. Having 
read them, I was struck by the extraordinary contrast between their definitions of 
music, and the equally extraordinary similarity between the functions they ascribe 
to music within the field of the arts generally. Admittedly these two books are in 
no sense a representative sample; but I would like to suggest that their similarities 
are symptomatic of what has remained quite constant in our sense of the condition 
of music, while their contrasts point to what has not only changed over time, but 
has for decades commanded no consensus. 
I have a strong feeling (though of course no proof) that very few people will 
have read both books, though both are well-known in their different spheres, and 
both seek to address similar questions of the status of art in the modern age. (A 
google search on the title of Lyotard’s book gets just over 4,000 hits; a search on 
the title of Hofstadter’s, well over 100,000; but a search on both titles used to get 
no hits at all, until the present article went on line.) And one can see why. Each 
presents a very firmly stated and unambiguous allegiance to a certain definition of 
art, of poetry as well as of music. Each would be very difficult to stomach for 
someone who fundamentally disagreed with that definition. And the two 
definitions are certainly utterly incompatible. 
Le Ton beau de Marot’s subtitle is: In Praise of the Music of Language. Its starting 
point is a little poem by Clément Marot, 24 lines long, with only three syllables in 
each line, which means that the rhymes occupy a third of all the syllables in the 
poem, and the whole poem is a mere 72 syllables long. The book, however, is of 
impressive dimensions: as well as 632 numbered pages, it contains 72 interleaved 
two-page sections, each giving one translation of the poem and a commentary on 
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that translation (not fortuitously, one translation for each syllable of the poem). 
The tales of their origins, and their juxtaposition, raise endless questions 
concerning what constitutes an acceptable, a good, or an excellent translation. 
Those questions turn out only to be answerable, really, against a background of 
enquiry on what we consider to be the essential features of a poem; which leads 
inexorably on to the question of what poetry is. This enquiry is intertwined with an 
examination of the possibilities, actual and theoretical, of machine translation, and 
of the models of artificial intelligence which underpin them, as well as with a 
narrative concerning the process by which Hofstadter came across or inspired the 
various translations that attract his attention, and a highly personal 
autobiographical account centring on the death of his wife, from a brain tumour, 
when their two children were still very young. All these strands are brought 
together by an impassioned profession of faith in the last chapter of the book, 
whose title is the same as the subtitle of the entire work: “In Praise of the Music of 
Language”. Here, at last, Hofstadter answers a question which, for anyone 
interested in the condition of music in verse, will have been hanging in the air for 
five hundred pages: what, exactly, is the music of language, in praise of which, 
according to the subtitle, the book has been written? Hofstadter has, up to this 
point, said remarkably little about what music is, though he has cited many songs 
and pieces of music which have been, in various ways, relevant to his pilgrimage in 
search of the best ways to translate the poem. He has, on the other hand, 
gradually, steadily, indeed one might say stealthily, been refining his definition of 
poetry, by means of his reflections on how we might judge translations. He has 
shown why, for him, only translations that take account of the formal patterns of 
the original poem can be received as themselves poetic; why regular verse can only 
be translated as regular verse. This leads to the following assertion, on the face of 
it unsurprising:  
 
the essence of the act of writing poetry is the indissoluble fusion of a 
medium with a message, the unsunderable wedding of form to content as 
equal partners. (524) 
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Now, he takes another step: he identifies good poetry with regular verse. And at 
the same time, he identifies good music with tonal music: 
 
around the turn of the twentieth century, a wave of change started rippling 
through the arts. In poetry, free verse started taking over, and in the world 
of classical or “serious” music, tonality was dropped, at least in some 
quarters, and replaced by a severe, austere, unhearable cerebrality; thus did 
music and poetry together start down the sad slide from being sensuous 
and visceral to being solely intellectual. And in the course of that slide, they 
lost more and more of their mass appeal, in the end becoming esoterica 
appealing only to tiny coteries and cliques of people who listened with 
humorless scholasticism and pretension. (526) 
 
He finds poetry that eschews the constraints of regular verse, like atonal music, 
aesthetically objectionable because in it, he cannot see content wedded to form. 
Instead, he sees a purely intellectual art in which “form is seen as the dog’s tail, 
content as its body” (527), and the artist refuses to let the formal tail wag the dog 
of content. This clearly does not correspond to his earlier definition of poetry. Is 
such modernist writing poetry, or not? Hofstadter soon provides the answer: to 
him, it isn’t. It usurps the name, but it is properly considered outwith the category. 
 
Though I feel more or less compelled by social conventions to use the 
word “poem” to describe these verbal constructions that repel me, they 
don’t satisfy my earlier stab at a definition of the term, at least not as far as 
I can tell. (526) 
 
Hofstadter’s opinions will doubtless strike the average reader of Thinking Verse as 
outrageously small-minded and reactionary. Is prose poetry, then, never poetry? Is 
all atonal music pretentious rubbish? More specifically, how can one maintain, as 
Hofstadter certainly seems to do here, that the “free verse” poets of the early 20th 
century were not very interested in form? But it is unfair to judge what he says 
here without having read the five hundred preceding pages. Hofstadter is not so 
naive as to set out these opinions before he has shown us why he might expect his 
readers to share them, perhaps in spite of themselves. What Hofstadter has been 
up to is this: he has presented the reader with endless examples of poetic originals 
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and translations, of all kinds, given his opinion on them, and asked the reader also 
to judge. In the process, he has gradually, and quite cunningly, drawn the reader 
into complicity with his fundamental principle that writing poetry is an exercise in 
wedding form to content. Content, generally speaking, we think we know how to 
translate. But what about form? He persuades the reader first, that form can only 
manifest itself as pattern; then, that translating poetry requires us to recognise 
patterns readily identifiable in the source language, before finding equivalents for 
them in the target language. This process obviously requires that the source text 
should contain such readily identifiable patterns; and it is first and foremost verse, 
regular verse, verse working with long-standing prosodic traditions already familiar 
to the reader, that confers them. Meanwhile, he has also (supporting his 
demonstration by citing Steiner’s After Babel) shown that all reading can be 
construed as translation. Thus he has set up the implicit syllogism: if translating 
poetry requires the recognition of formal patterns (of which traditional regular 
verse forms are the great wellspring), and all reading of poetry is translation, then 
all reading of poetry requires the recognition of formal patterns – of which 
traditional regular verse forms are the great wellspring. It is therefore crazy, as 
Gautier had said more than a century before Hofstadter (in his preface to 
Baudelaire’s Fleurs du Mal), to attempt to separate poetry from verse. “Vouloir 
séparer le vers de la poésie, c'est une folie moderne qui ne tend à rien de moins 
que l'anéantissement de l'art lui-même” (“Wanting to separate poetry from verse is 
a modern madness, leading to nothing less than the destruction of the art itself”). 
Of course, in a sense, Hofstadter is indeed being reactionary here. He knows it, 
and I need not set out why. The force of his argument lies in the sense that he is 
not trying to tell us any kind of rational truth; rather, he is trying to set out a 
certain set of beliefs about poetry rooted in what he calls his “religion”, which is “a 
reverence for pattern” (548). This religion is very deeply anchored in him, and he 
wants to think he is not alone in that. It would be churlish to try to explain exactly 
how he does this, but the sense of the importance of pattern, and of the 
preservation of pattern through the loss of the original matter in translation, is 
clearly wedded, in the book (just as content is wedded to form), to the way in 
which his wife, for him, remains alive, despite her physical disappearance. It 
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determines his definition of poetry. And that definition of poetry can only be 
explained, in the end, by reference to music.   
For Hofstadter, as we have seen, tonality is to music what regular verse is to 
poetry. To lose it, for him, is to lose an essential sense of the rootedness of form in 
recognisable pattern. Between works of art in the two media, what we perceive 
first, then, in this chapter, is a series of fundamental similarities. Both are subjected 
to the same process of definition by exclusion. There is good poetry and bad 
poetry, just as there is good music and bad music. Bad poetry, however, in an 
essential sense, is not really poetry at all; the people who maintain that it is are 
deluding themselves. Such is Hofstadter’s religious faith. Similarly, bad music is not 
really music at all. And how do we distinguish the good from the bad? Through a 
certain relationship between form perceived as pattern, and content, which means 
that neither can be separated from the other. To that extent, the condition of 
music is the same as the condition of poetry. Regular verse allows for the creation 
of that relationship between form and content, in the same way as tonality. 
However, there is also an equally fundamental dissymmetry in the relationship 
between the two media. 
The title of the chapter, let us remind ourselves, and the subtitle of the book, is: 
In Praise of the Music of Language. This does not suggest that music and poetry are 
simply two parallel arts in different media. There exists a music of language; but 
Hofstadter does not posit an analogous language of music, and the reason for this 
is clear. 
Language that is musical, language that has music, is poetry. The property of 
music separates two conditions of language: poetry, and non-poetry; the artistically 
valid, from the artistically non-valid. Later in the same chapter, Hofstadter, 
discussing translators of Dante, separates them into two camps. The first camp is 
those who “buy into the bleak and barren philosophy of “content first and last”, 
“content and only content”, or in short, Inhalt über alles and form can go to Hell 
(pardon my French)”. Their “translations, when read out loud, sound 
indistinguishable from ordinary prose in every respect that my tin ear can detect” 
(546). And what is the opposite of “ordinary prose”? The title of the next section 
of the chapter gives the answer: “The Music of Words”. The second camp, the 
Peter Dayan 
Thinking Verse II (2012), 9-26 15 
true translators, are those whose verse has music in it (Hofstadter’s italics, 546). The 
very best translators are those “who seem to have an impeccable sense for Dante’s 
meanings, meter, and rhymes – in short, for the total magic of Dante’s musicality” 
(547). What is the difference, here, between musicality, and poeticity, apart from 
the fact that (revealingly) the latter is a rare word whereas the former is a common 
one? It is this. If we accept (as Hofstadter invites us to) that bad music is not 
music at all, then all music is art. There is no musical equivalent of plain prose. The 
same clearly does not apply to language, since there exists, not only poetry (and 
bad poetry which is not really poetry at all), but also “ordinary prose”, in which 
form is perceived as subordinate to (rather than wedded to) content. It is perfectly 
possible to write good “ordinary prose”; ergo, not everything good in language is 
poetry. So how do we distinguish poetry from prose? It would be tempting to 
answer: poetry is in verse. However, there is clearly good verse and bad verse; and 
bad verse is not poetry. So the best answer we have to that question is: music. 
Music embodies, by its very definition, that wedding of form to content which 
distinguishes art. The music of language is the art of language; which is poetry. In 
short, the music of language is poetry. And there is no reciprocal version of this 
sentence, because there is no distinction in music analogous to the distinction 
between language and poetry. 
Perhaps one might be tempted to take a step backwards, and say: music can be 
opposed to sound in general, in the same way that poetry can be opposed to 
language in general. In which case, one might have been able to say: the poetry of 
sound is music. This would have restored the reciprocity of music and poetry: the 
condition of the former and the latter would have become once again mirror 
images of each other. Certainly – if one assumes that music is made of sound, in 
the same way that poetry is made of language. But for Hofstadter, this is not a safe 
assumption. What defines music is not, in the last resort, its sound. It is the 
relationship between the form that its sound may compose, and its content. 
Hofstadter invites us to consider the difference between variations on a theme 
in music, and variations on a theme in literature, as in Queneau’s Exercices de style. 
That difference is, he says, fundamental. 
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What is being varied, in music, is a specific set of notes forming a definite 
melody and having a definite set of harmonies; this theme can thus be 
stated precisely and unambiguously. In language, by contrast, the object of 
variation is not a set of discrete letters or words but something behind the 
scenes: an ill-defined event in space and time. Being a continuous, infinitely 
dissectable event, it cannot be captured in any finite sequence of words; it 
can surely be portrayed using sets of words, but no portrait is authoritative or 
final. (225) 
 
The theme of music, it would seem, is absolutely and forever indissolubly wedded 
to the physical substance composed by its notes. Its form simply cannot divorce its 
content. The content is not identical with the form, certainly, and we cannot define 
how the two relate to each other; nonetheless, without that precise form, the 
content would not exist. In language, on the other hand, the theme is always a 
perceived content, a meaning, which floats behind the words, “behind the scenes”, 
to some extent independently of the physical form of words. That is what founds 
the possibility of interlingual translation; that is why translation of words is a much 
easier concept to deal with than translation of music. The wedding of form to 
content in poetry is thus different in kind from the wedding of form to content in 
music. In poetry, divorce always threatens. Poetry can be translated, and whether, 
in translation, form as well as content is preserved always remains a worryingly 
open question. Good poetry can be badly translated – or badly read. Music, on the 
other hand, seems to represent an ideal state of art in which divorce remains 
unknown. It cannot be translated, because its content cannot live apart from its 
form. 
I should say at this point that I am not, here, stating my own opinion. As an 
academic, I am naturally aware of many arguments that contradict Hofstadter’s. 
For example, plenty of definitions of “translation” are now available according to 
which music can indeed be translated. However, it is difficult to deny that his point 
of view, his working definitions of poetry, music, and translation, remain more 
dominant and widely shared in the cultural world today than the academic 
arguments which shed doubt on them. The crudest illustration of this is the simple 
fact that his book has been more popular than Lyotard’s, and that this popularity 
has been with a non-academic audience in spite of the book’s formidable physical 
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size, peculiar punning bilingual title, challenging structure, bewildering range of 
reference, and often highly interdisciplinary subject-matter. And this is not 
incidental. As with his sense that true poetry must be in regular verse, and true 
music must be tonal, Hofstadter’s distinction between the condition of poetry and 
that of music cannot be defended in rigorous academic terms; but such a defence 
was never his aim. Rather, what he is professing is, he suggests, a faith, a religion, a 
coherent set of beliefs which is more widely shared than academics perhaps care to 
admit, even among academics themselves; a set of beliefs without which music and 
poetry themselves fall apart, but not only music and poetry: a certain sense of what 
holds us together. 
 
It goes without saying that Jean-François Lyotard would have had no time at all for 
Douglas Hofstadter’s persuasion that we should write poetry in regular verse, and 
music in keys. He loved the poetry and music of the 20th century that Hofstadter 
found so repulsive. In practical terms, then, his definition of music was completely 
different from Hofstadter’s. He would have had no difficulty in hearing music 
where Hofstadter would have heard only “numbing dodecaphonic cacophonies” 
(544). It might seem odd to suggest, then, that he saw the condition of music in 
the same way as Hofstadter. But that is exactly what I will be suggesting: different 
music, same condition. 
My examination of the condition of music, relative to that of poetry, in Le Ton 
beau de Marot, went through two phases. In the first phase, I found that the 
condition of music was the same as that of poetry; in the second, that an essential 
difference remained. I shall now attempt to show that the same applies in Moralités 
postmodernes. 
In Hofstadter’s book, the fundamental similarities that I tried to bring out 
between poetry and music centred first on the question of judgement, of definition 
by exclusion (only good poetry is really poetry at all, only good music is really 
music), and secondly, on the relationship between art, and content or meaning. 
Poetry, like music, but unlike “plain prose”, contains an element (commonly 
labelled form) which cannot be reduced to content or to meaning. Although its 
presence or absence can be pointed to by the critic as a means for determining 
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whether or not we are looking at a genuine poem or a genuine work of music, it 
constantly eludes qualitative analysis. Belief in its quality requires faith; and 
communicating that faith relies on an analogy with another art. The trick, in sum, 
is this. We know, as Hofstadter does, that poetry which we think is bad poetry 
(and therefore not really poetry at all) is referred to by other people as poetry, and 
that “social convention” compels us to accept this. The same applies to music. We 
also know that we cannot prove in any rational or academic way which works are 
good, and which works are bad. So how can we justify our faith in the quality of 
poetry or of music? Only by demonstrating that this quality exists as an essence, 
generally believed in, independently of the individual work and whatever can be 
said about it. Now, obviously, works of music and works of poetry are not the 
same works. Therefore, if we can suggest there is a condition of music equivalent 
to the condition of poetry, that condition must be independent of the individual 
work; a condition we can call that of art. The first step in founding this aesthetic of 
intramedial exclusion and intermedial equivalence must therefore be to suggest 
that works of art in different media are good in the same way, and that this quality 
of the artwork, though it may be linked to what can be described, as a meaning or 
content, also goes beyond the describable. Lyotard takes that step in the same way 
as Hofstadter – except that he tends to associate not just two arts, but three, or 
even more, all sharing the same condition. Like Hofstadter, he affirms the 
similarity between the arts in the same gesture as he refuses their reduction to 
meaning. And again like Hofstadter, he does this by polemical means: citing writers 
for whom meaning seems to be everything, who refuse the otherness of art, and 
narrating his passionate rejection of those writers. Hofstadter’s principal bêtes noires 
are Searle and Nabokov; Lyotard’s is the historian Pierre Nora. 
In “Intime est la terreur” (written in 1993), Lyotard remembers reading, in 1980: 
 
l’article-programme que Pierre Nora, l’un des maîtres de l’école française 
d’histoire, publia dans le premier numéro de la revue Le Débat, qu’il venait 
de fonder. (175) 
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[the programmatic article which Pierre Nora, one of the masters of the 
French school of history, published in the first number of the journal Le 
Débat, which he had just founded.] 
 
The very title of his journal defined Nora’s programme: it was to demand a new 
discipline in intellectual life, a discipline requiring all writing to be accessible, 
precisely, to debate. The meaning of a text was to be the measure of its 
acceptability, because it is by its meaning that a text participates in debate; and any 
text which proclaimed its function as beyond debate was to be rejected. 
 
Le moment était venu, déclarait-il en substance, de mettre un terme au 
désordre et à la terreur qui régnaient dans la critique et la philosophie 
françaises au point d’interdire tout débat. Se posant en héritiers des avant-
gardes artistiques ou littéraires, renchérissant sur la poétique 
incompréhensible de Mallarmé ou d’Artaud, s’enivrant de proses sibyllines 
comme celles de Heidegger ou de Lacan, les écrivains et les penseurs 
parisiens se formaient en groupes et se faisaient des guerres de mots, sans 
souci de se faire entendre les uns des autres ni du public. (175-6) 
 
[The time had come, so he was in substance declaring, to put an end to the 
disorder, to the terrorism dominating French philosophy and critical 
thinking to the point where all debate was forbidden. Posing as heirs to the 
literary and artistic avant-garde, taking to new extremes the 
incomprehensible poetics of writers such as Mallarmé or Artaud, 
intoxicated by the sybilline prose of Heidegger, Lacan and their ilk, Parisian 
writers and thinkers had formed themselves into groups doing battle with 
each other in words, without caring whether they were making themselves 
understood, by each other or by the public.] 
 
Note the distinction, which Lyotard attributes to Nora, between making oneself 
understood, and battling with words. It supposes that for Nora, the correct 
function of words is to be understood; whereas for the authors whom Nora 
criticises, words appear to have another function, which does not lead to 
understanding. It should be emphasized that Lyotard does not reject absolutely, in 
all circumstances, Nora’s principle that words must be used in such a way as to 
form part of a rational, comprehensible debate. Rather, it becomes clear in the 
essay that Lyotard’s aim is to distinguish between those contexts in which debate 
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should indeed be sovereign – which includes the human sciences, and generally all 
disciplines which consider themselves subject to the experimental method and to 
positive reason – and those contexts in which something must always exceed 
debate. To the latter, to the contexts where debate is exceeded, Lyotard initially 
seems somewhat averse to giving a label. But one only has to examine the list of 
examples he gives of works which belong to those contexts, which exemplify that 
excess, to see that it corresponds to quite a traditional notion of art, extended only 
by a certain kind of theoretical or philosophical writing; and more than that: to art 
considered as a transmedial phenomenon, fundamentally the same whether in 
words, paint, or music. 
Lyotard places his list in the context of a “stupeur”: he is stupefied by Nora’s 
apparent inability to appreciate the difference between (if I may allow myself the 
oversimplifying terms) art and non-art; stupefied, doubtless, because he simply 
cannot believe that Nora, or anyone else, could be entirely of good faith in denying 
that distinction. Do we not all, after all, love music, and know it exceeds reason? 
And do we not also know that poetry and music share an essential condition? 
 
Ma stupeur était la suivante: les Essais de Montaigne pouvaient-ils faire 
l’objet d’un débat et pouvait-on s’y retrouver en les lisant? Les Confessions 
d’Augustin, la Saison en Enfer? Mais aussi la Phénoménologie de Hegel, celle de 
Husserl ou de Merleau-Ponty? Et les Géorgiques de Claude Simon, Doktor 
Faustus, Le Château? Qu’y avait-il à débattre, et quoi donc à retrouver, dans 
les Demoiselles d’Avignon, dans La Tour Effeil de Delaunay, dans Mureau de 
Cage ou Répons de Boulez, dans le treizième quatuor à cordes de 
Beethoven? N’y avait-il pas dans les œuvres de la pensée, que leur matière 
fût de langue, de timbre ou de couleur, une solitude, un retrait, un excès sur 
tout discours possible, le silence d’une terreur? Et cela, non par caprice, par 
mode ou par défi, mais essentiellement – s’il était vrai, comme le dit 
Apollinaire, que l’œuvre exige de l’artiste de se faire inhumain. (176-7) 
 
[What I found stupefying was this: could Montaigne’s Essays be the object 
of a debate and could one see where one was going as one read them? 
Similarly, Augustine’s Confessions, Rimbaud’s Saison en Enfer? But also 
Hegel’s Phenomenology, and Husserl’s, and Merleau-Ponty’s? And Claude 
Simon’s Géorgiques, and Doktor Faustus, and The Castle? What was there to 
debate, how could one find one’s way, in the Demoiselles d’Avignon, in 
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Delaunay’s La Tour Eiffel, in Cage’s Mureau and Boulez’s Répons, in 
Beethoven’s 13th string quartet? Was there not in works of thought, 
whether their material was language, sound, or colour, a solitude, a 
reticence, an excess over all possible discourse, the silence of a terror? And 
this, not through caprice, not out of fashion, nor as a challenge, but as an 
essential condition – if it were true that, as Apollinaire says, the work 
demands of the artist that he make himself inhuman.] 
 
The trademark of the aesthetic tradition with which Lyotard aligns himself here is 
an alliance between a clear, direct, and uncompromising assertion that a category 
of works exists whose value cannot be determined by positive reason, and a subtle, 
often wily indirectness in the provision of arguments to support that assertion; 
arguments that are often implied by the examples given, rather than set out as 
such. I will allow myself time to point out some of them here. 
First: Lyotard avoids saying explicitly that the works he lists are works of art. 
That might have seemed to imply that he could give a definition of art which 
would set out its boundaries, and tell us which works belong to the category. But 
he cannot provide such a definition, since his whole argument is based on the 
premiss that art cannot be subject to debate. So instead of calling these works 
“art”, he initially calls them works of thought, “œuvres de la pensée”. However, in 
the last sentence of the passage quoted here, carefully sheltering behind Apollinaire 
and the expression “s’il était vrai que”, he clearly gives us to understand that for 
him, “essentiellement”, as part of their very conditions of existence, all these works 
are the result of a process in which their creators acquire the label of “artiste”. 
Second: Lyotard’s argument against Nora depends on his reader accepting the 
common status of all these works as in some sense beyond debate; and as we have 
seen, Lyotard himself accepts, at least implicitly, that this status corresponds to the 
category traditionally known as art. It seems to me legitimate, then, to ask to what 
extent the works on his list would be traditionally accepted as works of art. The 
answer to this question is clearly yes in the case of the paintings mentioned.  It is 
fairly clearly yes in the case of the three pieces of music (though Cage, it should be 
said, had problems with the concept of art, for much the same reasons as Lyotard). 
But what about the works in words? Most of them belong to genres traditionally 
classed as literary. Others, though, might be classed as philosophy; and the very 
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first, the essays of Montaigne, has long been received as on the borderline between 
philosophy and literature. Once again, we see that whereas the very condition of 
music (and like music, painting) is to be always already art, works in words are not 
always art, and the genre does not necessarily define the status of a work in words. 
A book labelled “philosophy” might be art, or it might be mere debate, mere 
positive reason; only the experience of reading will tell us which it is. 
Third: none of the works cited by Lyotard is in verse. There is one whose title 
alludes to verse, and one which is traditionally classified as prose poetry; but none 
actually written in verse. Why not? The answer emerges, I think, if one considers 
the painters and composers that Lyotard alludes to. Why Picasso and Delaunay? 
Why Cage and Boulez? and why, when mentioning Beethoven, the thirteenth 
quartet? Furthermore, why charge Apollinaire with articulating the essential nature 
of the relationship between the work and the artist? Five of these six men were 
central to the 20th-century contestation of traditional artistic forms and rules, 
precisely that “wave of change” which, according to Hofstadter, ended in disaster 
for the arts. Beethoven’s late quartets, and most particularly the thirteenth with its 
original ending, the Grosse Fuge, have often been received as an extraordinary 
premonition and prophecy of that wave. In short, the art that seems to Lyotard 
most characteristic, that most clearly demonstrates the condition of art as such, is 
art that contests the formal tradition. In this, he is very obviously refusing 
Hofstadter’s definition of music. Cage and Boulez would certainly be on 
Hofstadter’s list of composers whose work cannot be considered true music 
because it is not tonal, too much based on ideas and not sufficiently rooted in 
readily perceived traditional form, and therefore of interest only to a narrow 
public. It matters, in this context, neither to Lyotard nor to Hofstadter that 
Boulez’s relationship to the formal tradition is utterly different from Cage’s. What 
is important is that neither of them writes within the generally accepted parameters 
of what musicologists call “common era” tonality. Non-tonal music is not music, 
to Hofstadter, just as poetry not in regular verse is not poetry; Lyotard’s opinion 
could not be more clearly opposed to Hofstadter’s. They disagree fundamentally 
on what constitutes music. It is all the more remarkable that they do agree on its 
condition. 
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Lyotard’s rejection of Pierre Nora’s principles hinges on a simple refusal of 
Nora’s parameters. Nora’s demands (as relayed by Lyotard) related only to works 
in words, not to paintings or musical works. Lyotard refuses those demands 
through an indirect reasoning which has been common to many defenders of the 
exceptional, extra-scientific status of the work of art since the days of the 
Romantics. We all accept, do we not? that paintings and works of music operate 
beyond the reach of rational debate; positive reason cannot judge them. But we 
receive certain works in words, those we read as literature, in the same way as 
those works in other media. Therefore, we must accept that literature cannot be 
judged by positive reason, and is not required to enter into debate. Once again, we 
find that language has two distinct conditions: the human-scientific, the positively 
rational, necessarily accessible to debate; and a second condition analogous to 
music, which is traditionally called artistic or literary. Music, however, has only one 
condition. Music is always art; if it is not art, it is not music. It thus proves by its 
very existence that art exists. 
But, as Hofstadter saw so clearly, for this exceptional status of music to be 
secure, we must be able to say that music is not merely something made out of 
sound. If music is sound, then the distinction between music and sound might 
become dangerously similar to the distinction between poetry and language; and 
music might become a special use of sound (as poetry is a special use of language), 
rather than an aesthetic absolute. Lyotard sees the same danger, and provides the 
same solution. 
In another essay published in Moralités postmodernes entitled “Musique, mutique”, 
Lyotard describes at length the relationship between music and painting 
considered as arts, and their material. Significantly, literature is absent from this 
description; doubtless because its relationship to its material is different in kind. 
 
Si l’œuvre est d’art, c’est qu’elle témoigne d’un excès sur ce que le corps 
peut sentir, sur le sensible tel que l’ensemble des institutions du corps 
(biologiques, culturelles) le circonscrivent. (197) 
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[If the work is of art, it is because it bears witness to an excess over what 
the body can feel, over the category of the sensible as it is circumscribed by 
all the institutions of the body, be they biological or cultural.] 
 
This excess is not to be located in the material of the art, in the sound of the music 
or the colour of the painting; rather, Lyotard tells us, it is in an unarticulated 
breath, a timeless, voiceless lament which manages to slip through the articulated 
material form of the work. The beauty or sublimity of music is in that unarticulated 
breath, not in its material. And since music is nothing unless it is art, beautiful or 
sublime, it is nothing without that unarticulated breath. It follows that the beauty 
of music is dependent upon the failure of its form, which is constructed through 
the medium of sound, to contain the soundless excess within it. The heart of 
music is what we do not hear. Music tries to render it in sound; but it only 
succeeds as music to the extent that we sense its inability to do so. I will quote the 
entire last paragraph of the essay, since Lyotard’s reasoning is so dense that it is 
difficult to segment: 
 
Le geste musical travaille à laisser venir la plainte inaudible jusqu’à l’audible. 
Mais, pour cela, il doit lui donner forme. Il ne peut donc que la manquer 
toujours. Il la couvre. Cependant, ce vain travail peut suffire à évoquer, 
dans la langue musicale, le souffle de l’épouvante. Le meuglement est 
opiniâtre, permanent comme l’urgence de ne pas mourir. C’est pourquoi le 
témoignage que l’œuvre peut en porter, serait-il toujours suspect, ce 
témoignage que nous appelons sa beauté ou sa sublimité n’est pas non plus 
périssable. Il transite à travers les conjonctures historiques, comme le 
souffle de l’abattement se glisse à travers les battements qui segmentent 
l’espace sonore et qui donnent à la musique ses matériaux. (198) 
 
[The musical gesture strives to let the inaudible lament come to audibility. 
But for this purpose, it must give it form. Therefore, the musical gesture 
will always miss its aim, miss the lament, cover the lament. This vain 
striving, however, may suffice to evoke, in the language of music, the 
breath of terror. The animal cry is stubborn, as permanent as the urgency of 
not dying. That is why the witness the work may bear, be it always suspect, 
that witness which we call its beauty or its sublimity, is similarly not mortal. 
It passes through the conjunctures of history just as the breath of 
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oppression slips between the beats which segment the sound-space and 
which give to music its material.] 
 
This extraordinary passage, at the same time as it explains the fundamental 
difference between Lyotard’s concept of form and Hofstadter’s, betrays an equally 
extraordinary number of profound similarities between their aesthetics. 
First: music, for both of them, is self-evidently an art, a question of beauty. It 
cannot be anything else. And what makes it so, what makes it itself, its essential 
condition, is not exactly contained in the audible sound which we perceive; it 
comes from elsewhere. Therefore, we may say that music, although its material 
may be sound, becomes what it is through something other than sound. 
Second: the beauty that composes it, or that it composes, is not music’s alone. It 
is at root the same as the beauty of painting or of poetry. But the distinctive 
condition of music is that it has no existence of any kind without that beauty. 
And third: the power of music, the force of the inaudible lament which it fails 
to cover, stems from its relationship with death. The very title of Hofstadter’s 
book expresses this relationship, in the pun between “ton beau” and “tombeau”; 
and as the book progresses, the reader becomes steadily more aware that the magic 
of music, for Hofstadter, is in the way it connects us with the dead: in the first 
place Marot, and in the second, his wife. Lyotard is characteristically less willing to 
tie the condition of music to the memory of specific individuals; nonetheless, 
nothing could be clearer from “Musique, mutique” than that music is the 
imperfect veil allowing us to hear the complaint of mortality, the true “tombeau”. 
To return to my starting point: Le Ton beau de Marot offers a completely different 
answer from Moralités postmodernes to the question: which works constitute music? 
Hofstadter rejects all modernist art, and with it all music not written in keys. 
Lyotard, on the contrary, does not accept that the boundaries of tonality are also 
those of music. Rather, for him, they symbolise nothing more than the apparent 
limit of art before modernism, a limit that we will never have finished transgressing 
(and that the art of the past also, as he reads it, in its own way transgresses). But 
the two books nonetheless give surprisingly similar answers to the question: what 
is the condition of music? Music, in both books, is art; it is nothing but art, and if 
it is not art, it is nothing, it is not music. Thanks to that singular status, it gives us 
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our best hope of appreciating the true distinctive character of art. Whoever sees 
that character also in verse, will know that verse, too, is art; such is the power of 
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